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Abstract
This paper summarises the results of a
qualitative safety investigation into non-
precision approach operations supported by
GPS. The objective of the study is to verify
the assumptions made with respect to the
safety of GPS-NPA operations in
comparison with the typical German NPA
operations based on NDB/DME.
The study was carried out under assignment
of the Deutsche Flugsicherung. In the study
a number of benefits, as well as hazards, of
the introduction of GPS for NPA operations
were identified. Without nullifying the
potential safety benefits, the qualitative
assessment shows that especially crew
training is a critical issue when evaluating
the GPS NPA operation (compared to the
current NDB/DME procedure, with which
pilots are well experienced). The current
population of pilots, especially from General
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Aviation, is in general not yet trained for the
use of GPS equipment for IFR operations. If
no additional migration measures are
introduced, it is expected that initially the
introduction of GPS NPA operations may
lead to a less safe operation compared to the
current conventional NPA. At the same time
it is recognised that over time pilots will get
more experienced in the use of GPS.
Therefore, with the application of safety
management to ensure proper crew training,
the team is confident that GPS NPA
operations promise a safer operation than the
current NPA operation.
1 Background
In order to permit civil aviation to use
satellite navigation for en-route flights and
non-precision approaches as soon as
possible, the DFS has developed a strategy
for the implementation of satellite
navigation in three subsequent stages. The
first stage introduces the use of satellite
navigation as an additional navigation aid
and is completed. The second stage allows
the use of satellite based systems completely
independent from the conventional,
terrestrial navigation systems and the third
stage allows the reduction of the terrestrial
navigation aids.
For the approval of the second
implementation stage (the use of satellite
based systems independently of
conventional terrestrial navigation aids) the
ongoing evaluation program is
complemented with an analysis of the
assumptions with respect to the effects on
safety on which the German strategy is
based.
2 Approach
The qualitative assessment of the relative
safety of GPS-based NPAs is performed by
comparing the differences of the GPS-based
NPA with the NPA based on conventional
radio navigation aids. For that purpose, first
a clear description of the conventional NPAs
is compiled, then a list of hazards consisting
of differences between GPS and
conventional NPAs is compiled. This list of
differences is used for the actual relative
safety criticality analysis.
The NLR approach to perform a qualitative
safety assessment of any new concept,
system, procedure or measure in air traffic is
based on the AMJ 25.1309 of the Joint
Aviation Requirements [RD- 3, page 3-X-
27]. The methodology used in the study
recognises five steps:
Step 1: Identification of boundaries
Step 2: Identification of hazards
Step 3: Preliminary hazard analysis
Step 4: Hazard classification
Step 5: Decision making
3 Boundaries
3.1 GPS related hazards
As different studies have already focused on
the assessment of the GPS performance, the
draft ICAO GNSS SARPs [RD- 1] are taken
as a baseline. The specific risks associated to
the GPS satellite system (such as satellite
failures) are therefore not considered in this
safety assessment.
3.2 Airborne equipment related hazards
It is assumed that the airborne equipment is
certified according to the JAA and LBA
certification requirements [RD- 3, RD- 5
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RD- 6]. Therefore any specific hazards
related to the design of the airborne
equipment is not considered.
3.3 NPA procedure design related
hazards
It is also assumed that the non-precision
approach procedure is published according
to the relevant ICAO PANS-OPS criteria.
The additional constraints applied by DFS
when publishing NPA procedures in
Germany are taken into account in the
analysis.
3.4 Air Traffic Control
The availability of radar control to monitor
the stand-alone NPA operation is not a
mandatory requirement. For those airports
where ATC is not available (class F
airspace), specific restrictions are applied:
- Only one IFR operation at a time;
- Large passenger transport aircraft
operations are not allowed;
- VFR traffic has to establish radio
contact circa 5 min prior to entering the
respective airspace or circumnavigate
the airspace, if VMC minima for class F
airspace are not existing; and
- IFR routes are depicted on the VFR
approach plate.
4 Impact of the use of GPS for NPA
operations
4.1 General
The nominal changes to the NPA operation
with the introduction of GPS relative to the
conventional NDM/DME operation include
changes to:
Flight path: With the new operation the
flight path is independent from the
geographical location of beacons. Therefore
standardisation in the procedure design can
be pursued.
Beacons: The availability of beacons as a
reference during the operation is not taken
into account as the stand-alone GPS NPA
operation is considered contrary to the
current overlay procedures.
GPS performance: With the introduction of
GPS the position information in the aircraft
is based on GPS instead of radio navigation
beacons (NDB/DME). Its impact has been
considered.
Display: In principal the available displays
are used. However the GPS display may
contain different information (position of
aircraft with respect to ground track or VOR
radial) instead of direction of the beacon.
Usually the information is displayed on the
Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) in the
primary field of view of the pilot.
Selection of waypoints: With  the
introduction of GPS the air crew must be
able to handle waypoints to generate route
information such as "distance to next
waypoint".
Database: The waypoints are selected by the
air crew. The co-ordinates of the waypoints
are based on information from a database.
ATS information: in the pre-flight planning
ATC provides information related to the
availability of GPS integrity (Predictive
RAIM).
4.2 GPS as a positioning system
Compared to NDB, GPS offers different
system characteristics. The following
relative issues where introduction of GPS
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lateral navigation can influence the safety of
the operation have been identified:
1. Interpretation of presented lateral
information;
2. Susceptibility to weather conditions;
3. Accuracy;
4. Integrity.
Information presentation
The NDB offers the pilot a relative bearing
to the beacon. To follow or intercept a
desired ground track the pilot has to work
out a required heading. Especially in
unknown and changing cross-wind
conditions, translating the bearing
information to a required heading is at most
an inaccurate process.
On the other hand even the low-end GPS
receivers display cross-track error and actual
track. This information makes it easier for
the pilot to spot cross-track errors and
manoeuvre the aircraft towards the desired
ground track.
Susceptibility to weather conditions
NDB has been reported to show highly
unreliable indications, with sustained
erroneous inaccuracies of over 30 degrees,
during thunderstorms. Also milder
rainstorms can influence the NDB signal
whereas the GPS is shown to be merely
insensitive to these conditions.
Accuracy
With respect to the accuracy characteristics,
GPS does not share some specific NDB
error characteristics:
1. GPS position accuracy is independent
from the position relative to a beacon.
2. GPS does not suffer from a ‘cone-of-
silence', which normally has to be
overflown at a critical phase in the final
approach.
3. Fluctuations on the GPS position are
negligible compared to the fluctuations
on the NDB signal.
4. GPS accuracy is independent of the
surrounding geographical site.
A major improvement in terms of safety can
be derived from these characteristics.
Furthermore, with the improved accuracy,
combined with the additional information to
the pilot, it is expected that the rate of go-
arounds from a GPS approach will be lower
than the rate resulting from conventional
NPAs.
Integrity
The integrity of the GPS navigation solution
for the NPA operation depends on the
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
(RAIM) capability of the airborne receiver.
The airborne certification requirement is
such that RAIM will provide an integrity
warning in the cockpit if the GPS accuracy
can not be sustained within the required
alarm limit. Accurate GPS position
information can only be computed if
sufficient satellite coverage is present.
Therefore, the operation using GPS has the
drawback that it is dependent on satellite
availability at the time and location of the
(planned) operation. The RAIM algorithm
requires a minimum of 5 and preferably 6
satellites, which reduces the overall
availability of GPS/RAIM to around 97%.
To facilitate pre-flight planning, DFS has
implemented a RAIM predicting tool for the
GPS NPA operations.
More sophisticated integration techniques
using other positioning sensors such as the
integrated navigation System (INS) can be
used to augment GPS integrity as well.
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4.3 Use of a database for GPS approaches
In principle, the GPS provides nothing but
positioning information. Therefore in most
GPS systems a database of waypoints is
used to compute guidance information to the
(auto)pilot. Any mistake (or inaccuracy) in
the database information is directly
translated in a navigation error of the
aircraft.
Both RTCA and ICAO have defined
standards on the required accuracy and
integrity of the database information [RTCA
Do200A, RTCA Do201A, ICAO Annex 14
& 15]. Besides the performance
requirements also the quality assurance
process is defined of how the data must be
handled. Navigation databases that are used
in GPS receivers or FMSs are produced by
commercial vendors or airlines and are
based on information in the AIP.
Large errors in coding can be detected by
flight checking the procedure at least once
prior to publishing the procedure for public
operation, a policy already adapted by DFS.
However the crew is ultimately responsible
for the navigation of the aircraft, and an in-
flight check of the navigation information
(i.e. database) remains the responsibility of
the pilot. Tools for this cross-check should
be given to the crew (SOPs, published data
on the approach sheet comparable to the data
format applied in the GPS or FMS
database), e.g. a check on Missed Approach
Waypoint (MAWP, normally the runway
threshold) coordinates and the distance and
track between Final Approach Waypoint
(FAWP) and MAWP could be prescribed in
SOPs.
4.4 GPS integration in the aircraft
TSO compliant implementation of airborne
GPS receivers in airborne navigation
systems can be achieved at different levels
of integration with existing aircraft avionics.
Differences can occur with respect to:
• GPS stand-alone vs. GPS as position
input to an FMS (GPS+IRS+RNAV)
position;
• GPS guidance only vs. GPS guidance
coupled to an autopilot;
• GPS lateral position/guidance only vs.
GPS-aided FMS with VNAV
capabilities;
It is noted that, although a TSO approval has
been issued, some interfaces to GPS
receivers are not always perfect with respect
to ease of operation. The chance of
‘fingertrouble’ is sometimes evident.
The success of the introduction of GPS
depends highly on the prudent use of
certified sensors/databases and the actual
integration with the flight management
system (FMS) and the autopilot.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) can
aid the pilot in applying the correct actions
at opportune moments in the approach.
4.5 Impact on crew
Due to the complexity of the NDB/DME
operation, the conventional non-precision
approach includes many hazards related to
the pilot workload. It is clearly evident that
the pilot workload is a critical item,
influencing a potential lack of situational
awareness with the pilot of the aircraft's
position relative to the procedure. During the
evaluation of the GPS trial in Germany since
the 8th of October 1998, all pilot reports state
a decrease in the pilot workload and an
improved situational awareness. This being
a positive conclusion with respect to the
safety of the operation, care must be taken
that the crew is not 'overconfident' on the
presented picture.
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Quality assurances within major airlines
must mitigate the special risks involved with
these type of operations. Required SOPs,
charting procedures, approach minima, and
required aircrew training will and must be
part of the process of introduction of GPS as
a NPA. For smaller operations it is quite
common that training requirements are
fulfilled on the line or at a commercial
training institute, charts are bought from
Jeppesen without customization, SOPs are
less developed, and operational scrutiny by
quality assurance programs is less well
developed. To monitor these operations,
pilots must now demonstrate their ability to
perform GPS-approaches to the authorities
on their annual proficiency check. It is not
postulated that this means these operations
are less safe, but the size of the operation
does not justify the requirements large
operators have with respect to crew training
and operational quality assurance. It is
believed that especially the latter group will
benefit from safety measures already built
into the introduction of GPS approaches.
Operational pittfalls
From the flight trials, a number of specific
pittfalls associated with GPS procedures
relating to crew issues was mentioned by the
airlines involved in the trial. They will be
introduced here for further analysis in the
Qualitative Assessment in the following
chapters.
§ Timely arming of the approach
required; to obtain properly scaled
guidance and cross-track error
indications, the pilot is required to ARM
and ACTIVATE an approach prior to
the Initial Approach Waypoint (IAWP)
and FAWP respectively.
§ Short line-ups: positioning the aircraft
on the final approach track within the
FAWP may introduce unwanted
responses with just about every GPS-
implementation.
§ Last-minute changes to the navigation
plan: contrary to conventional NPAs,
last-minute changes to the navigation
plan (initiated by either the pilot or
ATC) are not easily accommodated,
resulting in increased head-down time
and increased workload.
4.6 Impact on ATC
In theory the new operation should not affect
the air traffic control operation. However,
Air Traffic Controllers should be aware of
some shortcomings:
§ The way the approach is defined using
non-changeable waypoints the clearance
"Direct-To" a waypoint that is not
defined in the active flight plan of the
GPS procedure can not be easily
accommodated in the FMS: it is possible
that the approach is cancelled and
guidance reverts to terminal sensitivity.
§ Furthermore, as has been mentioned in
the previous paragraph, ATC should
refrain from providing radar vectors
inside the FAWP.
4.7 Procedure design
The way the procedure is designed is in line
with the PANS-OPS criteria. The use of
waypoints is expected to contribute heavily
to operational safety: the design of the
procedure is no longer limited by the
geographical position of the radiobeacons.
This flexibility should be used by future
procedure-designers by applying a GPS
approach template where possible. This will
lead to a familiar picture to the pilot
everywhere a GPS approach is executed.
From the operators involved in the flight
trials, some issues related to procedure
design that have been mentioned:
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• A possible confusion between GPS
distance-to MAWP and DME readings
could lead to the aircraft being
positioned on the wrong glidepath.
• when an intermediate stepdown-
waypoint is published in the procedure,
this could lead to distance-to-stepdown-
waypoint being misread for distance-to-
missed-approach-waypoint and vice
versa.
5 Relative safety assessment
This study is limited to safety issues related
to the introduction of GPS NPAs,
economical issues were intentionally not
addressed. It was found that a number of
issues promise to enhance the level of
safety, while others constitute potential
hazards to safety, particularly in the
implementation phase.
5.1 Safety benefits of using GPS
The technical system characteristics of GPS
(superior accuracy compared to NDB, pilot
interface flexibility and the possibilities for
the procedure-designer) have brought up a
number of issues that can increase the level
of safety of the operation. These issues, as
identified in Table 5, are:
- presentation of relevant navigation
information
- less susceptibility of navigation system
performance for adverse weather
conditions
- increased, and more consistent, position
accuracy
- go-around rate and lateral path
following in the missed approach phase
- Support of RNAV/LNAV and VNAV
- decreased pilot workload
- improved situational awareness
- possibility for a consistent design of the
NPA procedure
5.2 Safety hazards of using GPS
Issues that constitute hazards were subject to
a hazard analysis and classification process.
This is described in more detail in [RD-1].
Combining a probability of occurrence with
an independently assessed severity class
leads to a qualification of the hazard
category.
Safety critical hazards are identified to have
at least one element of the analysis in the
"unacceptable" region (Table 3). Tolerable
hazards have at least one element of the
classification in the "tolerable" region.
For “unacceptable” hazards it is necessary to
make improvements to mitigate the
identified risks associated with the
operation, at least to the level of “tolerable”
risks. For “tolerable” risks the ‘As Low As
Reasonably Practical’ (ALARP) principle
must be abided with. This means, where
reasonably possible, these risks must be
reduced to the lowest practicable level, and
safety management (e.g. monitoring) should
be performed. “Negligible” hazards do not
constitute a safety hazard to the operation.
The following safety hazards were
identified:
Unacceptable hazards
 Crew: Inadequate crew training;
 Crew: Last minute change of navigation
plan
 Crew: Timely arming of the GPS
approach
 Charting: Confusion between GPS
waypoints;
 Charting: Confusion between GPS and
DME readings;
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Tolerable hazards
 GPS: GPS/RAIM availability;
 Database: Database integrity;
 Crew: Arming of the correct GPS
approach
 Crew/ATC: Intercept to the GPS
approach inside the FAWP;
 ATC: ATC Communication (cleared for
waypoint that is not on the approach
chart)
 Database: Coding of waypoint
attributes.
5.3 Hazard Classification
After the hazards classification some
hazards are classified as “unacceptable”. A
major unacceptable hazard is related to crew
training aspects. GPS operations are a
relative novelty to the pilot community.
Tuition in GPS characteristics, failure modes
and operational requirements has only
recently been introduced to instrument-flight
curricula. Furthermore, even though the
equipment considered is TSO-approvedm
the (type dependent) pilot interface can lead
to “fingertrouble” resulting in an
unacceptable aircraft trajectory. Also a large
potential exists for pilots to have
'overconfidence' in the system.
Furthermore, the chance of a CFIT occurring
because of ambiguous information published
on the approach plate possibly confusing the
pilot, is classified as an “unacceptable”
hazard. This observation relates to the
vertical descent profile, based on barometric
altimetry that is performed by adhering to
published altitudes during the final approach
segment. Omission of a stepdown-waypoint
can mitigate the risk of waypoint-confusion
during the approach. Publishing a combined
DME/GPS altitude table should be avoided,
or typographic measures should be taken so
that the correct information is unmistakably
identified.
Tolerable risks were identified to be related
to the GPS, the database, crew procedures
and the relation to ATC. The ALARP
principle incurs that proper training
standards are adhered to by pilots that ATC
controllers are informed about aircraft
limitations on GPS NPAs and that database
manufacturing remains an issue ruled by
strict Quality Control Assurance and other
methods ensuring data integrity such as
Flight Inspection..
6 Conclusions
The approach of DFS, LBA and the
contributing operators in the GPS evaluation
towards the certification, the procedure
design and the development of crew
procedures for the GPS based non-precision
approach operation, has been one of
cautiousness. The decision to perform flight
inspection of the new procedures, to publish
the GPS procedures for authorised operators
only, to develop the GPS/RAIM prediction
tool and the development of specific
Standard Operating Procedures by the
operators, all clearly contributed to a
successful and safe implementation of the
GPS non-precision approach during the trial
phase. The safety team concluded that all
these measures are in fact required to
maintain the current success of the
implementation of the GPS procedure.
Each identified relative hazard has been
classified, estimating the probability of
occurrence and the effects of the hazards. As
a result 11 hazards were identified. Of these
a number of hazards have been classified as
unacceptable, specifically related to crew
training and charting.
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For these unacceptable hazards, it is
necessary to make improvements to mitigate
the risks associated with the operation. For
each hazard some potential risk reducing
measures are proposed.
Without nullifying the potential safety
benefits, the assessment shows that crew
training is a critical issue when evaluating
the GPS NPA operation (compared to the
current NDB/DME procedure, with which
pilots are well experienced). The current
population of pilots especially from General
Aviation is in general not yet trained for the
use of GPS equipment for IFR operations.
The crew training should be focused on:
- Overall knowledge of the GPS
characteristics and failure modes;
- The use of the GPS equipment installed
in each specific aircraft (including rapid
handling of waypoints);
- Avoiding 'overconfidence' in the GPS
and the related equipment.
If no additional migration measures are
introduced, it is expected that initially the
introduction of GPS NPA operations may
lead to a less safe operation compared to the
current conventional NPA. At the same time
it is recognised that over time pilots will get
more experienced in the use of GPS and that
the level of safety will rise above the safety
of the conventional non-precision approach
in due time.
With the application of safety management
to ensure proper crew training, the team is
confident that GPS NPA operations promise
a safer operation than the current NPA
operation.
7 Recommendations
Nine recommendations have been provided
to improve the level of safety of the GPS
based NPA.
1. It is recommended that approach plates
are changed so that they do not show a
combined distance-to-waypoint and
local DME-distance versus altitude table
for the final descent. Introducing
typographic distinction between GPS
information and DME information
achieves the same goal.
2. It is recommended that the final
approach segment is defined by two
waypoints only (FAWP and MAWP).
3. It is recommended that a generic
training syllabus is made available to the
pilot community. Such a syllabus should
also be available in German language.
4. It is recommended that DFS extends the
policy adapted in the trial phase that
GPS NPAs are available to authorized
users only. Authorization should only be
granted after an operator has
demonstrated that some kind of GPS
Implementation Plan demonstrating:
§ Unit Installation and Operation in
accordance with TSO C-129.
§ Adequate SOPs for Normal and
Abnormal situations.
§ Adequate Training Program in
force.
For private operators pilot proficiency
must be demonstrated to the authorities
during the proficiency check.
5. It is recommended that database
manufacturing remains subject to a
Quality Assurance Program.
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6. It is recommended that DFS extends the
policy of flight-checking a procedure
prior to publication.
7. It is recommended that the GPS/RAIM
Prediction Tool for pre-flight planning
remains in force.
8. It is recommended that the air traffic
controller community is made aware of
airborne limitations on GPS NPAs.
9. It is recommended that safety
management is applied including
adequate monitoring and active
feedback by the key actors and
verification that the recommendations
are effectively implemented.
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Tables
Table 1: Definitions of severity categories according to JAR AMJ 25.1309 (qualitative).
Description Definition
Catastrophic Failure conditions, which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.
Hazardous Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent
that there would be:
• A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,
• Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew cannot be
relied upon to perform their task accurately or completely, or
• Serious injury or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the
occupants.
 Major  Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent
that there would be, for example:
• A significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,
• A significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew
efficiency, or
• Discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries.
 Minor  Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aeroplane safety,
and which involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor
failure conditions may include, for example:
• Slight reduction of safety margins,
• Slight increase in crew workload, or
• Some inconvenience to occupants.
Table 2: Definitions of probability levels according to JAR AMJ 25.1309 (qualitative).
Description  Estimate of Probability
Probable Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire operational life of
each aeroplane1
Remote Unlikely to occur to each aeroplane during its total operational life1 but
which may occur several times when considering the total operational life of
a number of aeroplanes of the type.
Extremely
Remote
Unlikely to occur when considering the total operational life of all
aeroplanes of the type, but nevertheless, has to be considered as being
possible.
Extremely
Improbable
So unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire
operational life of all aeroplanes of one type.
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Table 3: Hazard Classification matrix based on JAR AMJ 25.1309.
Severity
Probability Level Catastrophic Hazardous Major Minor
Probable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Tolerable
Remote Unacceptable Unacceptable Tolerable Negligible
Extremely remote Unacceptable Tolerable Negligible Negligible
Extremely improbable Tolerable Negligible Negligible Negligible
Table 4: Reference NPA
Particular Reference value/description Comment
Obstacle clearance
Procedure according to PANS OPS
design criteria
Additional DFS constraints
apply
Approach segments
considered
Initial, intermediate, final and missed
approach. With or without radar vectors
in initial and/or intermediate approach.
Arrival segment is not
considered ‘worst case’
Lateral guidance
NDB/DME is most common in German
airspace
NDB shows worst error
characteristics.
Vertical guidance
Stabilized approach path from FAF to
threshold supplied using multiple DME
fixes
DFS criterion
Aircraft approach
category
Types A-D
Category E is not
considered (military
fighter).
Aircraft equipment -
lateral indication
All types considered (TDI, RMI, HSI,
and MAP)
Aircraft equipment -
lateral guidance &
control
All types considered (with or without
AP and/or FD)
Aircraft equipment –
vertical indication
All types considered (with or without
VNAV deviation indication)
Aircraft equipment –
vertical guidance &
control
All types considered (with or without
AP and/or FD)
All have particular
hazards associated. Not
clear what is ‘worst case’.
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Table 5: Relative implications that possibly affect the safety of a non-precision approach as a
consequence of introducing GPS to support the non-precision approach operation.
Id Short Description Potential impact 1
1. GPS distance information. No impact
2. Presentation of relevant navigation information. Benefit
3. Susceptibility to common weather phenomena. Benefit
4. Increased, and more consistent, position accuracy. Benefit
5. Go-around rate and execution Benefit
6. Availability Hazard
7. Database integrity Hazard
8. Coding of waypoint attributes Hazard
9. Area navigation Benefit
10. LNAV Benefit
11. VNAV Benefit
12. Crew training (required system knowledge and SOPs) Hazard
13. Pilot workload during the approach Benefit
14. Pilot situational awareness. Benefit
15. Arming of the correct GPS approach. Hazard
16. Timely arming of the GPS approach. Hazard
17. Interception of the GPS approach inside the FAWP. Hazard
18. Last-minute changes in navigation plan Hazard
19. R/T load Benefit
20. ATC communication: cleared to waypoint not in the
active flightplan
Hazard
21. Consistent procedure design Benefit
22. Confusion between GPS and DME readings Hazard
23. Confusion between GPS waypoints Hazard
